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>Til Death Do Us Part:  Why Personal Jurisdiction Is 
Required to Issue Victim Protection Orders Against 
Nonresident Abusers 
I. Introduction 
Sarah, a young bride, believes her groom, John, is perfect.  Soon after 
they take their vows, John=s criticism of Sarah transforms into verbal abuse.  
His command keeps her trapped in their home.  His temper places her in 
fear.  And eventually, his fist leaves a mark on her face.  John apologizes 
and reminds Sarah how much he loves her.  For better, for worse, Sarah 
forgives her husband.  This happens again C and again.  Sarah has thought 
about leaving, but now she is pregnant.  After the baby arrives, the stress at 
home increases.  The blood and bruises are nothing new, but the words out 
of John=s mouth are new: “You better believe me when I say that I will kill 
you.”  But, the baby crying causes him to relax the hands that were 
tightening around Sarah=s neck. 
The next day, before John gets home from work, Sarah packs a suitcase 
with her clothes and things for the baby.  With the little one in the car seat, 
she heads south on Interstate 35.  The drive from Kansas City to Oklahoma 
City is five hours.  Three years prior to the drive, Sarah left her parents= 
house in Oklahoma City; she has only talked to them a few times since the 
day she said goodbye.  But now there is nowhere else for her to go.  Sarah 
calls them for help, and her mom promises she will have dinner and a warm 
bed waiting for her. 
Back in Kansas City, John gets home from work, and the house is empty.  
Where is Sarah?  She has very few friends because he rarely allows her to 
leave the house.  It is too late for the baby to have a doctor=s appointment.  
John thinks, she will be back.  She has threatened to leave several times, but 
she always comes back.  He calls Sarah=s cell phone repeatedly, but she 
does not answer.  It gets later, and he realizes she is gone.  He suspects she 
is with her family in Oklahoma City. 
Sarah knows it will not take long for John to figure out where she is.  
She is fearful that if John finds her, the abuse will be worse than ever 
before.  Upon Sarah=s arrival, she and her mother go to the Oklahoma 
County courthouse and file a petition for an ex parte emergency victim 
protection order.  Within hours of the order being issued, and unbeknownst 
to Sarah, John is driving through the Kansas prairie, on his way to 
Oklahoma . . . 
*     *     * 
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Hopefully, the above hypothetical is as difficult for the reader as it was 
for the author to imagine.  Unfortunately, reality closely mirrors this 
situation all too often.  Domestic violence plagues the entire nation.1  
During 2008, more than 500,000 acts of abuse were committed in the 
United States against women by their intimate partners,2 “[a]nd more than 
2,000 [people] were killed by [their] intimate partners.”3  Oklahoma is 
certainly not immune to domestic violence C 25,189 incidents of domestic 
abuse were reported to law enforcement during 2009.4  Furthermore, more 
than 100 people in Oklahoma are killed each year as a result of domestic 
violence.  Forty-three percent of intimate partner homicide victims were in 
the process of leaving their perpetrators.5  Like Sarah, many other 
Oklahomans seek protection from abuse by filing for victim protection 
orders.6  During the first eight months of 2008, 2,400 victims of domestic 
abuse petitioned for victim protection orders in Oklahoma County District 
Court.7 
During the mid-1970s, states began recognizing the lethal nature of 
domestic violence and passed legislation that enabled judges to grant victim 
protection orders in civil court.8  Currently, all fifty states and the District 
of Columbia have domestic violence statutes providing for victim 
protection orders.9  In 1982, the Oklahoma legislature joined this reform 
                                                                                                                 
1.  See Eric Holder, U.S. Att=y Gen., Speech at Domestic Violence Awareness Month 
Event (Oct. 19, 2009). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
4. INFO. SERVS. DIV. & INFO. TECH. SERVS. DIV., OKLA. STATE BUREAU OF INVES-
TIGATION, STATE OF OKLAHOMA UNIFORM CRIME REPORT ANNUAL REPORT 8-2 (2009), 
available at http://www.ok.gov/osbi/documents/2009%20UCR%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
Domestic Abuse includes such offenses as murder, sex crimes, assault, and assault and 
battery. Id. Domestic abuse reports have increased by 14.2% between 2000 and 2009. Id. 
5. OKLA. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW BD., OKLA. STATE BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOMICIDE IN OKLAHOMA ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter FATALITY REVIEW BOARD], available at http://www.oag.ok.gov/oagweb.nsf/0/ 
53d 98acaf26a9585862577b5004ed38b/$FILE/2009%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
6.  See Bryan Painter, Oklahoma County Filings Show Increase for Protective Orders, 
THE OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 28, 2008, http://newsok.com/oklahoma-county-filings-show-
increase-for-protective-orders/article/3303774. 
7.  Id.  This was the largest number of victim protection orders applied for in Oklahoma 
County since 2003.  Id.  Two-thousand four hundred filings for victim protection orders “is 
123 more than in the same time period [in 2007] and 173 more than [in 2006].” Id. 
8. Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with 
Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL=Y REV. 51, 53 (2000). 
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, ' 1045 (1999); IOWA CODE ANN. ' 236.2 (West 
2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 403.725 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, ' 1 
(West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. ' 2C:25-18 (West 2005). 
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and passed the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act.10  Sections 60-60.18 
of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes provide protection for victims of 
domestic abuse in Oklahoma.11  Despite both proactive and remedial efforts 
to curb domestic violence, Oklahoma is still ranked fifteenth nationally for 
having the highest number of women murdered by men each year.12 
These high numbers are not mitigated by vagaries in the existing laws.  
The question remains unanswered whether the protection granted by a 
victim protection order extends to women, like Sarah, who come to 
Oklahoma seeking shelter from domestic abuse.  When victims of domestic 
violence flee the homes they share with their abusers, they often seek 
refuge with friends, family, or in shelters, and many move to another city or 
state to hide from their abusers.13  This can raise a number of difficult 
questions for the courts.  What if none of the acts of violence occurred in 
Oklahoma?  What if her abuser has not yet set foot on Oklahoma soil?  
Must Oklahoma have personal jurisdiction over the abuser to issue a victim 
protection order against him?  Or, is a victim protection order instead a 
declaration of the victim=s protected status, which does not demand 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant?  The state=s interest in protecting 
victims located within its borders should not jeopardize the abusers= 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, but the mere possibility that 
those rights are conceivably in play should not leave victims of abuse 
completely unprotected.  A major hurdle stands between victims that come 
to Oklahoma seeking shelter and the protection from abuse afforded by the 
state of Oklahoma under Title 22, Sections 60-60.18 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes.  The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act does not specify 
whether the state must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant-abuser 
to issue a victim protection order against him.14  Furthermore, if personal 
                                                                                                                 
10.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.6 (Supp. 1982) (current version at 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 
60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007).  
11.  22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18.  
12.  VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2008 
HOMICIDE DATA 15 (2010), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2010.pdf. Other 
reports claim Oklahoma ranks ninth.  Editorial, Deadly Results: Domestic Violence Death 
Rates Too High, THE OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 4, 2009, at 16A.  Oklahoma was ranked fourth for 
number of women killed by men in 2008.  Amy Lester, Oklahoma Ranks Fourth in 
Domestic Violence, (KWTV News 9, Oklahoma City television broadcast Oct. 2, 2008) 
available at http://www.newson6.com/Global/category.asp?C=121535&clipId=2974674 
&autostart=true. 
13.  Lee Ann Jones, Note, Domestic Relations: Oklahoma=s Protection from Domestic 
Abuse Act, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 349, 359 (1983). 
14.  22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18.  
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jurisdiction is required, the Act does not indicate how the state might 
achieve personal jurisdiction over a nonresident abuser.15 
Part II of this comment describes Oklahoma=s response to the prevalence 
of domestic violence in the state, and the process for obtaining a victim 
protection order under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, as well as 
the federal government=s response to this danger.  Part II will also describe 
the traditional requirements for satisfying procedural due process and 
briefly discuss the constitutionality of ex parte emergency protective orders.  
Part III will examine the three rationales embodied in cases where other 
states have answered the jurisdictional question presented in the scenario 
above.  Part IV will evaluate these three rationales under the microscope of 
Oklahoma law and suggest how Oklahoma ought to balance the state=s 
interests in both protecting victims of domestic abuse and ensuring a 
nonresident defendant=s right to due process is upheld.  This comment 
concludes in Part V. 
II. Victim Protection Orders and Due Process Requirements 
A. The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act 
Before the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act was passed in 1982, a 
victim of domestic abuse could only get a court order to stop abuse if the 
victim was married to her abuser and had filed for divorce or separate 
maintenance.16  As a result, prior to the passage of the Protection from 
Domestic Abuse Act, many victims of domestic abuse were precluded from 
civil protective relief.17  The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act 
expanded the class of victims that could petition for protective relief by 
defining “domestic abuse” as “any act of physical harm, or the threat of 
imminent physical harm” when the abuser and the victim “are family or 
household members or who are or were in a dating relationship.”18  The 
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act defines “family or household 
members” as: 
[S]pouses, ex-spouses, present spouses of ex-spouses, parents, 
including grandparents, stepparents, adoptive parents, and foster 
                                                                                                                 
15.  See id. 
16. Jones, supra note 13, at 350; see 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 1276 (1981) (allowing for 
obtaining protective orders during dissolution proceedings) (current version at 43 OKLA. 
STAT. ' 110.B.2 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (providing for ex parte temporary restraining order 
after filing petition for dissolution of marriage)). 
17.  See Jones, supra note 13, at 350. 
18.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.1.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). 
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parents, children, including grandchildren, stepchildren, adopted 
children, and foster children, persons otherwise related by blood 
or marriage, persons living in the same household or who 
formerly lived in the same household, and persons who are the 
biological parents of the same child, regardless of their marital 
status, or whether they have lived together at any time.19 
Under the statute, a “‘[d]ating relationship,’ means a courtship or 
engagement relationship.”20 
A basic understanding of how a victim protection order is obtained, its 
effect, and how it is enforced, is necessary to understand the due process 
implications of this court order.  A victim of domestic abuse may seek relief 
under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act by filing a petition for an ex 
parte emergency protective order in Oklahoma district court.21  Victims of 
domestic violence often file their petitions for protective orders pro se.22  
The Oklahoma legislature requires that the Administrative Office of the 
Courts develop a standard form for the petition and for both ex parte and 
final protective orders.23  The court clerk provides the form petition to the 
victim-plaintiff at the courthouse.24  Furthermore, the Oklahoma State 
Courts Network provides downloadable and printable versions of these 
forms on its website.25  The statute specifically provides that upon the 
plaintiff=s request, “the court clerk or the victim-witness coordinator, victim 
support person, and court case manager shall prepare or assist the plaintiff 
in preparing the petition.”26 
                                                                                                                 
19.  Id. ' 60.1.4. 
20. Id. ' 60.1.5 (specifying that a dating relationship does not include “a casual 
acquaintance or ordinary fraternization between persons in a business or social context”).  
Domestic violence reaches far beyond the confines of marriage; the Oklahoma Domestic 
Violence Fatality Review Board reported that fifty-two percent of domestic partner violence 
homicides were current or former “intimate partner” homicides.  FATALITY REVIEW BOARD, 
supra note 5, at 1.  
21.  22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60.2-60.3. 
22. See LISAE JORDAN & BETTE GARLOW, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL LAW MANUAL: 
PROTECTION ORDERS AND FAMILY LAW CASES ch. 3, at 3 (Rebecca Henry ed., 3d ed. 2007). 
23. 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60.2.B, 60.3.A, 60.4.D.  These forms are available online at 
http://www.oscn.net/static/forms/aoc_forms/protectiveorders.asp.  The two most relevant to 
this article are the Petition for Protective Order and the Petition for Emergency Temporary 
Protective Order, cited infra, which are linked on this site. 
24.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2.B. 
25. THE OKLAHOMA STATE COURTS NETWORK, http://www.oscn.net/static/forms/district 
forms.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
26.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2.D. 
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The district court judge reviews the plaintiff=s petition, and “if the court 
finds sufficient grounds within the scope of the Protection from Domestic 
Abuse Act” it holds “an ex parte hearing on the same day the petition is 
filed[,]” before the defendant-abuser receives notice or has an opportunity 
to be heard.27  Generally, district court judges grant hearings on the victim=s 
petition for a protective order.28  If, at the hearing, the victim shows good 
cause for the protection order, and the court finds an emergency protection 
order is “necessary to protect the victim from immediate and present danger 
of domestic abuse,” the emergency ex parte protection order is granted and 
remains in effect until there is a full hearing with the defendant present.29  
A copy of the victim=s petition, “notice of hearing, and a copy of [the] 
emergency ex parte order issued by the court [are then] served upon the 
defendant;” the victim protection order is effective as soon as the defendant 
is served.30  Regardless of whether the court grants or denies the emergency 
ex parte order, a full hearing will be held within twenty days of filing for 
the protection order.31  If, by the date of the full hearing the defendant has 
not yet been served, the plaintiff-victim can then request to renew the 
petition or the emergency protective order with a new hearing date.32 
After either the emergency ex parte hearing or the full hearing, “the court 
may impose any terms and conditions in the protective order that the court 
reasonably believes are necessary to bring about the cessation of domestic 
abuse against the victim.”33  Commonly, the court order will prohibit the 
defendant from contacting, abusing, injuring, threatening, harassing, and/or 
stalking the petitioner.34  A protection order may also require the defendant-
abuser to vacate the home he shares with the victim or order the defendant-
abuser to stay a certain distance away from the victim=s residence.35  Most 
noteworthy is the court=s wide discretion for ordering relief beyond what is 
                                                                                                                 
27.  Id. ' 60.3.A. 
28.  See Painter, supra note 6.  Oklahoma County Special Judge Barry Hafar said, “When 
there=s domestic violence and you see that in the application, there=s a no tolerance policy.” 
Id.  Judge Hafar has granted a hearing to nearly ninety percent of victims that have filed a 
petition for protection.  Id. 
29.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.3.A; see JORDAN & GARLOW, supra note 22, ch. 3, at 3 (“Ex 
parte orders are not enforceable until served on the respondent.”). 
30.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.4.A. 
31.  Id. ' 60.4.B.1. 
32.  Id. '' 60.4.B.3.-60.4.B.4. 
33.  Id. ' 60.4.C.1. 
34. See Petition for Protective Order at 4-6 and Petition for Emergency Temporary 
Protective Order at 4-6, supra note 23. 
35.  Id. 
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indicated on the pre-printed form.36  The final protective order typically 
stays in effect for three years.37  
The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act is found in Title 22 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes, which pertains to criminal procedure.38  On its face, 
this can cause some confusion.  Protection orders issued under the 
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are civil protection orders.39  The 
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals found victim protection orders were 
“civil, not criminal, in nature” because, in criminal actions, the state 
prosecutes “a person charged with a public offense.”40  Clearly, a petition 
for a victim protection order is filed by the victim, not the state; therefore, it 
is a civil action.  The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act creates a private 
cause of action resting with the victim.41  Because an action for a victim 
protection order is not criminal, the rules of civil procedure apply, and the 
victim protection order is a legally binding court order.42  Unlike the penal 
role of criminal courts, a victim protection order issued by a civil court “is 
meant to prevent future abusive behavior rather than punish past 
behavior.”43 
There are, however, criminal penalties for violating an ex parte or final 
protection order.44  The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act is most likely 
included in the state=s criminal procedure title because of the criminal 
sanctions imposed for violations of victim protection orders.45  A first 
conviction for violating a victim protection order is a misdemeanor and is 
punishable by a fine and/or up to one year imprisonment.46  A second 
violation of a victim protection order is a felony offense and is punishable 
by a higher fine and/or one to three years imprisonment.47  For both the first 
                                                                                                                 
36.  See Petition for Protective Order at 6, supra note 23, and Petition for Emergency 
Temporary Protective Order at 5, supra note 23. 
37.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.4.G (stating this to be the case unless extended, modified, 
vacated, or rescinded).  Often final protective orders are referred to as “permanent” 
protective orders.  This term is misleading, because protective orders are rarely permanent. 
See JORDAN & GARLOW, supra note 22, ch. 3, at 5. 
38.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18.   
39.  Marquette v. Marquette, 1984 OK CIV APP 25, & 10, 686 P.2d 990, 993.  
40.  Id. (quoting 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 7 (Supp. 1983)). 
41.  See Tobkin v. State, 777 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
42.  See Waul, supra note 8, at 54. 
43.  Id. 
44.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.6 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
45.  See id. 
46.   Id. ' 60.6.A.1. 
47.  Id. ' 60.6.A.2. 
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and second violation, if the violation actually injures the plaintiff, the 
sanctions are more severe.48 
It is also important to recognize that protective orders issued under the 
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act listed above are distinct from an ex 
parte temporary restraining order issued under Title 43, Section 110 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes.49  Under Title 43, the petition for a restraining order 
must accompany a petition for the dissolution of marriage; therefore, it is 
limited to a spousal relationship.50 
The state of Oklahoma recognizes the statewide and national validity of 
protection orders issued in accordance with the Protection From Domestic 
Abuse Act in Oklahoma.51  Furthermore, Oklahoma presumes the validity 
of protection orders issued by other state=s courts “even if the foreign 
protection order contains provisions which could not be contained in a 
protective order issued by an Oklahoma court.”52 In accordance with the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) enacted by the United States 
Congress in 1994,53 Oklahoma gives full faith and credit to all valid victim 
protection orders issued by other jurisdictions.54  Not only does the VAWA 
promote full faith and credit among the states, the VAWA also makes it a 
federal crime to cross state lines to violate a victim protection order.55  
Furthermore, federal law prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm 
or ammunition if he is subject to a victim protection order that prohibits 
him from harassing, stalking, threatening, or using force reasonably 
                                                                                                                 
48.  Compare id. ' 60.6.A.1 (penalty for first violation of victim protection order that 
does not result in injury to plaintiff), and id. ' 60.6.A.2 (penalty for second violation of 
victim protection order that does not result in injury to the plaintiff), with id. ' 60.6.B.1 
(penalty for first violation of victim protection order that results in injury to the plaintiff), 
and id. ' 60.6.B.2 (penalty for second violation of victim protection order that results in 
injury to plaintiff). 
49.  43 OKLA. STAT. ' 110.B.2 (2001 & Supp. 2006). 
50.  Id.; but see 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2.A.1-60.2.B.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (“If the 
dissolution of marriage action and the petition for a protection order are filed separately, the 
two actions may be consolidated.”). 
51.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.7 (2001). 
52.  Id. ' 60.12.A (2001). 
53. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 16, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).  
54.  Id.; “[f]oreign protective order means any valid order of protection issued by a court 
of another state or a tribal court.” Id. ' 60.1.6 (internal quotations omitted); see also 18 
U.S.C. ' 2265(a) (2006) (not self-executing). 
55.  See id. ' 2262.  It is also a federal crime to travel across state lines for the purpose of 
committing domestic violence, see id. ' 2261(a)(1), or to cause an intimate or dating partner 
to cross state lines for the purpose of committing domestic violence, see id. ' 2261(a)(2). 
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expected to cause injury to another.56  In Oklahoma, fifty-seven percent of 
domestic homicide victims are killed with a firearm.57  
B. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process 
In Kulko v. Superior Court of California,58 the United States Supreme 
Court declared that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the state courts to 
enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident defendants.”59  
Generally, to satisfy procedural due process, the defendant must be given 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.60  Furthermore, the court must have 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter,61 as well as personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.62  Personal jurisdiction gives the court the power to render a 
“binding judgment against the defendant.”63 
The purpose of Oklahoma=s “long-arm statute is to extend the 
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts to the outer limits permitted by the 
Oklahoma Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.”64  The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court held that personal jurisdiction is not avoided merely because a 
nonresident defendant did not physically enter the state.65  Jurisdiction 
under the long-arm statute may be predicated on activities in another state 
that result as harm in the forum state.66  The outer limits of due process 
require that in order to subject a nonresident defendant to a court=s 
judgment against him, the nonresident defendant must have certain 
“minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”67  
                                                                                                                 
56.  See id. ' 922(g)(8). 
57.  See FATALITY REVIEW BOARD, supra note 5, at 4. 
58.  436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
59.  Id. at 91. 
60.  See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also 
Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petrol. Corp., 1986 OK 16, & 12, 732 P.2d 438, 443, n. 25. 
61.  See 27A AM. JUR. 2D. Equity ' 62 (2008).  
62.  See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 91 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1878); Int=l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see also 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity ' 62 
(2008). 
63.  Conoco Inc. v. Agrico Chem. Co., 2004 OK 83, & 16, 115 P.3d 829, 834. 
64.  Id. & 17, 115 P.3d at 834; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2004.F (2001 & Supp. 2007) 
(allowing Oklahoma court to “exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the 
Constitution of the state and the Constitution of the United States.”). 
65.  Hough v. Leonard, 1993 OK 112, & 7, 867 P.2d 438, 442. 
66. See id. (citing Fields v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 1976 OK 106, & 6, 555 P.2d 48, 
52). 
67. Gilbert v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of Okla., 2006 OK 58, & 16, 152 P.3d 165, 173 (internal 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
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The nonresident defendant=s “conduct and connection with the forum State 
[must be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there.”68  The nonresident defendant “must have meaningful ‘contacts, ties 
or relations’ to the forum state.”69 
The Oklahoma judiciary follows a two-step process for ascertaining 
whether the court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.70  
First, the court asks if the defendant has the requisite minimum contacts 
with Oklahoma such “that he should have reasonably anticipated being 
haled into court there.”71  Second, if minimum contacts are established, the 
court examines whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with 
“fair play and substantial justice.”72  When determining the reasonableness 
of a nonresident defending his suit in the forum, Oklahoma courts consider 
the following factors: “the burden on the defendant,” “the [state=s] interest 
in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff=s interest in obtaining convenient 
and effective relief,” the interest of the interstate judicial system in 
obtaining an efficient resolution, and the shared interest of the states in 
“furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”73  However, a 
nonresident defendant may waive his objection to the court=s improper 
exercise of personal jurisdiction.74  If the nonresident defendant makes a 
general appearance without specifically objecting to the court=s assertion of 
personal jurisdiction, he consents to the court=s jurisdiction by waiver.75 
Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is not required when 
the court is adjudicating the status of one of its domiciliaries.76  Every state 
has the power to determine or alter the status relationship between those 
                                                                                                                 
quotation marks omitted); see Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 1965 OK 212, && 25-33, 
418 P.2d 900, 907-909 (providing an analysis of the rational of long-arm jurisdiction as 
expressed in Int=l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).  
68.  Gilbert, & 16, 152 P.3d at 173 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 
69.  Klassen v. Lazik, 2004 OK CIV APP 46, & 8, 91 P.3d 90, 92 (citing Int=l Shoe, 326 
U.S. at 319). 
70.  See id. && 10-11, 91 P.3d at 92-93. 
71.  See id. & 10, 91 P.3d at 92-93 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). 
72.  Id. & 11, 91 P.3d at 93 (citing Int=l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320)(internal citations omitted). 
73.  Lively v. IJAM, Inc., 2005 OK CIV APP 29, & 27, 114 P.3d 487, 494-95 (citing 
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). 
74.  See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2012.A (2001 & Supp. 2007) (making general appearance 
waives lack of personal jurisdiction defense); Russell v. McGinn, 1973 OK 43, & 14, 514 
P.2d 658, 660 (citing Turner v. Big Four Petrol. Co., 1954 OK 244, & 13, 274 P.2d 524, 526-
27). 
75.  See Russell v. McGinn, 1973 OK 43, & 14, 514 P.2d 658, 660. 
76.  See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942). 
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found within its borders and nonresidents when the state has a strong 
interest in the status relationship, like marriage, at issue.77 
While an emergency ex parte protective order is issued before the 
defendant has notice or the opportunity to be heard, ex parte victim 
protection orders have consistently survived constitutional challenges.78  In 
Marquette v. Marquette,79 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that 
protection orders issued ex parte do not violate the defendant=s right to due 
process.80  The court noted that domestic violence had become “a problem 
of considerable magnitude.”81  In Marquette, the defendant argued that an 
ex parte order for protection, entered under the Protection from Domestic 
Abuse Act, was a violation of procedural due process.82  The defendant 
alleged that the state interfered with his liberty by prohibiting him from 
communicating with his wife, the custodial parent, thus denying him the 
right to visit his child.83  Under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, 
the defendant is not afforded an opportunity to appear until after the 
emergency protective order is issued.84  The court weighed the defendant=s 
right to due process with the state=s interest in protecting victims of 
domestic abuse and the risk of erroneous deprivation.85  The court held that 
the “State=s interest in securing immediate protection for abused victims”86 
and the procedural safeguards contained in the Protection from Domestic 
Abuse Act survived the demands of due process.87  The court applied the 
Mathews v. Eldridge88 test in balancing the infringement on the defendant=s 
rights before notice and opportunity to be heard against the government=s 
interest in issuing the protective order and the risk of erroneous deprivation 
under existing procedures.89  The court determined the state had an interest 
                                                                                                                 
77.  See id. 
78.  See e.g., David H. Taylor et al., Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of Protection: 
How Easing Access to Judicial Process has Eased the Possibility for Abuse of the Process, 
18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL=Y 83, 93-100. 
79.  1984 OK CIV APP 25, 686 P.2d 990. 
80.  Id. & 20, 686 P.2d at 996. 
81.  Id. & 18, 686 P.2d at 996. 
82.  Id. & 16, 686 P.2d at 995. 
83.  Id. 
84.   22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.3.A (2001 & Supp. 2007)  
85.  See id. & 18, 686 P.2d at 995-96. 
86.  Id. & 19, 686 P.2d at 996. 
87.  Id. 
88.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
89. Marquette && 17-20, 686 P.2d at 995-96 (footnotes omitted).  An ex parte order is 
only issued after the plaintiff shows good cause at the hearing and the court finds the order 
“is necessary to protect the victim from immediate and present danger of domestic abuse” 
and a hearing is held 10 days after the ex parte order is issued.  See id.  While there is some 
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in “securing immediate protection for abused victims”90 because of the 
magnitude of the problem and the serious risk of death if abuse continued.91  
The court held that, when balanced against the state=s interest in protecting 
victims of domestic abuse, the procedural safeguards embedded in the 
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act prior to the issuance of an ex parte 
order sufficiently protected the defendant=s due process rights.92 
Like notice and opportunity to be heard, personal jurisdiction is a due 
process issue.  However, the question of what constitutional guarantees can 
be sacrificed with respect to personal jurisdiction cannot be answered by 
the inquiry made in Marquette.  While the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
agreed that the state=s interest in protecting victims of domestic violence is 
lofty,93  the court has not ruled on the due process issue pertaining to 
personal jurisdiction.  Oklahoma has yet to examine whether a 
nonresident=s due process rights remain secure when personal jurisdiction is 
not required before issuing a victim protection order against him.   
III. The Jurisdictional Requirements of Other Courts 
A. Status Jurisdiction 
Nathan and Tara Bartsch were in a situation much like John and Sarah in 
the opening hypothetical.94  While Nathan and Tara were together, they 
lived in Utah.95  Tara and their infant daughter left Utah and went to Iowa 
to live with Tara=s parents.96  Nathan lived in Utah and Colorado and was 
not a resident of Iowa when Tara filed an application for a temporary 
protective order in Iowa district court under Iowa=s Domestic Abuse Act.97 
Nathan moved to dismiss the order granted by the district court for want 
of personal jurisdiction.98  The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district 
court=s legal conclusion that “personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant is not required for a court to enter an order preserving the 
protected status afforded Iowa residents under [the Domestic Abuse 
                                                                                                                 
risk of erroneous deprivation, the judge has the opportunity to examine the credibility of the 
plaintiff before granting the order.  Id. 
90.  Id. & 20, 686 P.2d at 996. 
91.  See id. && 18-19, 686 P.2d at 996. 
92.  See id. && 19-20, 686 P.2d at 996. 
93.  See Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 10, 213 P.3d 550, 555. 
94.  See Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Iowa 2001). 
95.  Id.  
96.  Id. 
97.  Id.; see also IOWA CODE ANN. ' 236.1 (West 2008). 
98.  See Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 5. 
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Act].”99  The court analogized victim protection orders with divorce 
decrees, child custody determinations, and actions to terminate parental 
rights, all of which do not require personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
but rather allow jurisdiction because the state has the authority “to 
determine the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants.”100  Just as the 
state can determine the status of someone within its borders as being either 
married or single,101 the court held that the Domestic Abuse Act “clearly 
creates a status of ‘protection;’” therefore, the state can determine the status 
of the plaintiff, even though the defendant-abuser is not personally subject 
to the state=s jurisdiction.102 
The Supreme Court of Iowa believed that if status jurisdiction applied to 
divorce actions, then it certainly applied to victim protection orders, finding 
that “[t]he greater and more immediate risk of harm from domestic 
violence” made “application of the status exception to protective orders 
even more compelling than in [divorce] actions.”103  The court went on to 
declare: 
[T]he State=s interest in protecting victims of domestic abuse is 
equal to, if not greater than, its interest in actions determining 
child custody or terminating parental rights because it involves 
the safety of the protected parties.  If the State can make 
adjudications without personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
parent in custody determinations in which it has a strong state 
interest, it also has that right in domestic-abuse protection 
actions in which it has an even stronger interest.104 
To determine if the state has proper jurisdiction for a child custody 
proceeding, Iowa follows the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act,105 which does not require personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant-parent.106  Child custody proceedings include legal custody, the 
termination of parental rights, and, specifically, orders protecting a child 
from domestic violence.107  The court further stated that the state=s 
“domestic-abuse statute evidences a special solicitude for potential abuse 
                                                                                                                 
  99.  Id. at 6. 
100.  Id. at 6, 9 (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877)). 
101.  See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).  
102.  Id. at 7; see also Williams, 317 U.S. at 298-299 (1942). 
103.  Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 9. 
104.  Id. 
105.  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY & ENFORCEMENT ACT ' 201, 9 U.L.A. 672 (1997).  
106.  See IOWA CODE ANN. ' 598B.201 (West 2008). 
107.  Id. ' 598B.102(4). 
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victims.”108  To support this claim, the court cited the provisions of the 
Domestic Abuse Act that allow the petition to be filed without cost to the 
plaintiff-victim, that make forms available to pro se plaintiffs, and that 
allow the county attorney to assist the plaintiff.109 
The court in Bartsch relied on an opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court to support its holding.110  In In re Adoption of J.L.H.,111 the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court used the status jurisdiction rationale to decide the 
issue of proper jurisdiction for nonconsensual stepparent adoption.112  
Where the biological mother was a resident of Kansas, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court determined personal jurisdiction was not needed because,  
[t]he so-called minimum contacts doctrine . . . was fashioned to 
gauge the standards of due process for the exercise of 
jurisdiction to render an in personam judgment against one not 
served within the state C a form of forensic cognizance that is 
not implicated in this case because here no personal judgment is 
sought against the Kansas mother.113   
Applying the Oklahoma Supreme Court=s rationale, the Supreme Court 
of Iowa found the protective order “does not purport to grant affirmative 
relief against the defendant; it merely preserves the protected status 
accorded to the plaintiff by [the Domestic Abuse Act].”114  A protective 
order “does not attempt to impose a personal judgment against the 
defendant.”115  Under analogous facts, Bartsch was controlling in Doe v. 
Iowa District Court for Scott County in 2007.116 
The dissent in Bartsch maintained that a protective order under Iowa=s 
Domestic Abuse Act was not a status determination.117  Justice Carter 
vehemently emphasized that Tara Bartsch sought injunctive relief against 
her husband, not a declaration of her status.118  Furthermore, the dissent 
stated that an injunction was affirmative relief.119  In his dissent, Justice 
                                                                                                                 
108.  Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 9. 
109.  Id. (citing IOWA CODE ' 236.3(7), .3A(2), .3(B)(1999)).  
110.  See id. at 8. 
111.  1987 OK 25, 737 P.2d 915. 
112.  Id. & 9, 737 P.2d at 918-19.  
113.  Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 8 (quoting J.L.H., & 9, 737 P.2d at 919). 
114.  Id. at 6. 
115.  Id. at 10. 
116.  Doe v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Scott Cnty., No. 06-0696, 2007 WL 913851 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Mar. 28, 2007). 
117.  See Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 11 (Carter, J., dissenting). 
118.  See id. 
119.  See id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/10
2011] COMMENTS 835 
 
 
Carter noted that the United States Supreme Court=s broad interpretation of 
due process “operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to 
enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident defendants” and 
a nonresident defendant=s rights and interests go beyond money judgments 
against him.120  The dissent asserted that Nathan Bartsch=s liberty interests 
were substantially affected as a result of the victim protection order being 
issued against him, which included restricting his right to possess a firearm, 
and “there [were] collateral consequences of a lasting nature.”121 
B. Personal Jurisdiction 
The facts leading up to the Family Court of Delaware=s decision in T.L. 
v. W.L.122 also resemble those in both the opening hypothetical and the 
Bartsch case.  In T.L., the husband, wife, and two children lived in Ohio.123  
After allegedly suffering abuse from her husband, the wife and two children 
left Ohio and moved in with the wife=s mother in Delaware.124  Two days 
after arriving in Delaware, the wife filed for a victim protection order.125 
Following the precedent that the “[c]ourt must weigh an individual=s 
rights of due process against Delaware=s strong interest in preventing abuse, 
and the necessity for taking prompt action,” the court determined that the 
“husband=s rights of due process vastly outweigh[ed] the state=s legitimate 
concerns to protect its resident . . . from domestic violence.”126  The court 
held that under Delaware law, victim protection orders could not be issued 
against nonresident defendants without the state first having personal 
jurisdiction over them.127  The court based its decision on a reading of the 
Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders 
Act,128 which required participating states to enforce victim protection 
orders issued by other states so long as the issuing court had personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant-abuser.129  The court also looked to 
principles of federal constitutional law which provided that a judgment 
issued by a court in one state must be given full faith and credit by all other 
                                                                                                                 
120.  Id. (quoting Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978)). 
121.  Id. at 11-12 (citing 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(8) (2006) (prohibiting a person subject to a  
victim protection order from possessing a firearm)). 
122.  820 A.2d 506 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003). 
123.  Id. at 507. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. at 513-14.  
127.  See id. at 516. 
128. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, ' 1049 (West 2009)(adopting the Uniform Interstate 
Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act into Delaware statutory law). 
129.  See id. at 513. 
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states, so long as due process was not violated when the order was 
issued.130 
The Family Court of Delaware began waffling in its decision to require 
personal jurisdiction, however, when it suggested that if the plaintiff-victim 
had been a “bona fide resident” of the state, the traditional personal 
jurisdiction requirements might be relaxed, so as not to “hinder the state in 
determining the status of [its bona fide resident].”131  The T.L. court did not 
reject Bartsch on the basis that issuances of protection orders are not status 
adjudications.  Rather, the Delaware court gave two reasons for requiring 
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant-abuser: (1) while 
Delaware had lowered minimum contact requirements in status 
determinations, the wife had only been in Delaware for two days, so she 
was not a bona fide resident of Delaware and the due process requirements 
should not be relaxed; and (2) the wife=s application for a protective order 
did not suggest the husband had minimum contacts with Delaware because 
all acts of abuse occurred in Ohio.132  The court recommended that the wife 
seek protective relief in Ohio.133  In dicta, the court suggested that had the 
wife=s application for a victim protection order “alleged that husband had 
pursued the family into Delaware while making additional threats and 
placing wife and children in fear of harm” the court=s decision may have 
been different, because the nonresident defendant would have established 
minimum contacts with the state.134 
The court distinguishes T.L. from Bartsch by suggesting that in Bartsch, 
because neither party resided in the state where the acts of abuse allegedly 
occurred, “the Iowa court found it reasonable for Iowa to proceed with the 
case.”135  Furthermore, Tara Bartsch filed her application for the victim 
protection order one month after arriving in Iowa.136  While the Delaware 
court may be suggesting that the Bartsch court decided a victim protection 
order is a status determination because the victim was a bona fide resident 
                                                                                                                 
130.  See id. at 514. 
131. Id. at 512-13 (quoting Cohen v. Cohen, 84 A. 122, 124 (Del. Super. Ct. 1912) 
(pertaining to the dissolution of marriage)). 
132.  Id. at 514. 
133.  See id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  See id. at 514-515.  Most of the facts contained in the allegations occurred in Utah. 
Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 10 (Iowa 2001).  The wife lived in Iowa at the time she 
applied for the victim protection order, and the husband was living in either Utah or 
Colorado.  Id. at 5.  The Supreme Court of Iowa stated, “[w]ith respect to residence, 
Nathan=s status is unclear.” Id. at 10.  
136.  See T.L., 820 A.2d at 514. 
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of Iowa, the Supreme Court of Iowa never addressed residency 
requirements for making determinations regarding the status of the state=s 
residents.  The Family Court of Delaware clearly acknowledged that while 
the state has “an important interest in fostering the protection against 
domestic abuse, its power to do so should be tempered to be sure that it is 
serving bona fide residents and not extending protective [o]rders against 
persons lacking requisite minimum contacts with the state.”137 
C. Different Jurisdictional Requirements Apply Based on Whether 
Prohibitive or Affirmative Relief is Ordered 
Similar facts arise again in Shah v. Shah:138 a husband and wife lived in 
Illinois, where she was allegedly abused.139  She fled to New Jersey to stay 
with family friends.140  Once in New Jersey, the wife applied for a 
temporary restraining order under the state=s Prevention of Domestic 
Violence Act.141  The New Jersey Supreme Court held that “if personal 
jurisdiction cannot be exercised over a [nonresident] defendant within 
constitutional due process limits, the temporary restraining order may only 
provide for prohibitory relief.”142  The court further held that the issuance 
of a final restraining order required minimum contacts, because, by 
statutory definition, a final order includes an order of affirmative relief, e.g. 
the surrender of firearms.143 
In determining whether personal jurisdiction was required before the 
court could issue a victim protection order, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
agreed with the lower court=s distinction between prohibitive and 
affirmative relief and reasoned: 
[A prohibitory order] allows the entry of an order prohibiting 
acts of domestic violence against a defendant over whom no 
personal jurisdiction exists, [and] is addressed not to the 
defendant but to the victim: it provides the victim the very 
protection the law specifically allows, and it prohibits the 
defendant from engaging in behavior already specifically 
                                                                                                                 
137.  Id. at 516. 
138.  875 A.2d 931 (N.J. 2005). 
139.  Id. at 933. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  See id. at 942. 
143.  Id. at 940.  One against whom a victim protection order has been issued is required 
to surrender firearms and pay a civil penalty and a surcharge.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. ' 2C:25-
29b (West 1991). 
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outlawed.  Because the issuance of a prohibitory order does not 
implicate any of [the] defendant=s substantive rights, the trial 
court [has] jurisdiction to enter a temporary restraining order . . . 
.144 
While the Shah court was “unpersuaded by the ‘status exception’”145 in 
Bartsch, it still upheld the issuance of a victim protection order despite the 
defendant not having the requisite minimum contacts with the state.146  The 
court maintained the propriety of personal jurisdiction “when a court 
attempts to exercise its coercive power to compel action by a defendant.”147 
Presented with analogous facts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals followed 
the Shah court, holding that prohibitory orders do not require personal 
jurisdiction to satisfy due process.148  In Spencer v. Spencer, the Kentucky 
court found that the distinction between prohibitory and affirmative relief 
was “the fairest balance between protecting the due process rights of the 
nonresident defendant and the state=s clearly-articulated interest in 
protecting the plaintiff and her child against domestic violence.”149  In 
Spencer, the order was vacated and remanded back to the county circuit 
courts with instructions to limit the protective order to prohibit the 
nonresident abuser “from breaking the law in Kentucky by approaching [his 
wife and daughter].”150  Specifically, aspects of the victim protection order 
issued by the county circuit court that were to be excluded were those 
forbidding the possession of a firearm and requiring attendance of domestic 
violence counseling, because these were said to be affirmative obligations 
placed on the defendant, over whom the court did not have personal 
jurisdiction.151  
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Caplan v. Donovan,152 
was also presented with a situation involving a nonresident defendant-
abuser and the plaintiff-victim seeking shelter in the state.153 The Caplan 
Court agreed with the Iowa Supreme Court that a victim protection order 
                                                                                                                 
144.  Shah, 875 A.2d at 939. 
145.  Id. at 940 n.5.  
146.  See id. at 939-940. 
147.  Id. at 939. 
148.  Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006). 
149.  Id.  See id., n.8 (citing Barnett v. Wiley, 103 S.W.3d 17, 19 (Ky. 2003) (“[T]he 
domestic violence statute should be construed liberally in favor of protecting victims from 
domestic violence and preventing future acts of violence.”)). 
150.  Id. at 19. 
151.  See id. 
152.  879 N.E.2d 117 (Mass. 2008). 
153.  See id. at 119-20.  
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required status jurisdiction generally, and personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident defendant was not required.154  The Massachusetts court 
explained that its holding “furthers the Commonwealth=s important public 
policy goal of securing ‘the fundamental human right to be protected from 
the devastating impact of family violence’ . . . by declaring the protected 
status of a person who is currently domiciled in this Commonwealth after 
coming here to escape from abuse.”155  By requiring personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant, the Commonwealth would leave the victim 
with two unpalatable alternatives for getting protection:  the victim could 
“return to the State in which the abuse occurred,” or “wait for the abuser to 
follow the victim to the Commonwealth and, in the event of a new incident 
of abuse, seek an order from a Massachusetts court.”156 
While the Iowa Supreme Court alluded to the due process limitations 
applied to status determinations, the court in Caplan specifically set out that 
status determinations must be “limited to prohibitions that relate to the 
protected status of a person within the Commonwealth.”157  The court stated 
that due process limitations to status determinations included: (1) that the 
victim protection order “must provide the defendant with reasonable notice 
and an opportunity to be heard”;158 and (2) that “a valid judgment imposing 
a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only 
by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.”159  
Therefore, the Massachusetts court held that “a court may issue . . . an order 
of prevention and protection even without personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, but may not impose affirmative obligations on the defendant if 
there is no personal jurisdiction.”160 
Most recently, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire followed the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court=s reasoning in Caplan.161  In Hemenway v. 
Hemenway, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the wife 
failed to “demonstrate facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.”162  Because the New Hampshire court did not have personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the court limited the victim 
                                                                                                                 
154.  Id. at 123. 
155. Id. at 123 (quoting Champagne v. Champagne, 708 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1999); 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d 79 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)). 
156.  Id. at 123. 
157.  Id. at 124. 
158.  Id. at 123. 
159.  Id. at 123 (citing Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978)). 
160.  Id. at 119. 
161.  See Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575 (N.H. 2010).  
162.  Id. at 580 (quoting Chick v. C & F Enter., 938 A.2d 112 (N.H. 2007). 
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protection order “to the extent that it protects the wife from abuse,” and 
“reverse[d] to the extent that the order require[d] affirmative action from 
the defendant.”163  The court specifically pointed to the conflict that arose 
between the state=s “strong interest in providing protection to victims of 
domestic violence within [the] State” and requiring personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.164  Like the courts in Shah, Spencer, and Caplan, the 
Hemenway court found the state=s policy interest in the victim=s protected 
status outweighed the need for personal jurisdiction if the victim protection 
order contained merely prohibitory relief.165 
IV. Analysis 
Unlike high courts in Iowa, Delaware, New Jersey, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not 
yet decided whether a petition for a victim protection order is a status 
determination, a civil injunction that requires personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident defendant, or if the jurisdictional requisites vary depending on 
whether prohibitive or affirmative relief is ordered. 
It is unquestionable that the state of Oklahoma has a strong interest in 
protecting people residing within its borders.  Specifically, there is a strong 
state interest in protecting people within the state from acts of domestic 
violence.166  Just two years after the passage of the Protection from 
Domestic Abuse Act, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals commented: 
 In the absence of any legislative history, it is reasonable to 
assume the passage of the Act is a result of increased public 
awareness regarding the serious nature of domestic violence.  
The Legislature has attempted to remedy this problem by 
providing immediate, as well as long-range, protection for the 
victims of domestic abuse.167   
The court went on to state that “[t]he State=s interest in providing this 
protection to the victims of domestic abuse is apparent.  The [Protection 
from Domestic Abuse Act] promotes the health, safety and general welfare 
of its citizens.”168  The Oklahoma legislature equipped the people with a 
tool to combat domestic violence C access to victim protection orders.  At 
                                                                                                                 
163.  Id. at 582. 
164.  Id. (quoting McNair v. McNair, 856 A.2d 5, 14 (N.H. 2004)).  
165.  See id. 
166.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
167.  Marquette v. Marquette, 1984 OK CIV APP 25, & 9, 686 P.2d 990, 993. 
168.  Id. && 6, 18, 686 P.2d at 993, 996.  
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the same time, this public policy and safety concern may threaten 
nonresident defendants= due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.169  An analysis of the three 
approaches taken by other courts and described in Part III of this article 
leads to the conclusion that Oklahoma courts cannot deny nonresident 
defendants due process by pretending victim protection orders are status 
determinations, and that statutory amendments would be the best method to 
assert personal jurisdiction over those nonresident defendants 
A. Because a Victim Protection Order Is a Civil Injunction, Oklahoma Must 
Have Personal Jurisdiction over a Nonresident Defendant in Order to 
Safeguard Due Process 
With any court order entered against an individual, the requirement of 
personal jurisdiction is the standard rule.170  Victim protection orders are no 
exception.  The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges 
warned attorneys representing victims that they should “[b]e prepared to 
counter respondents= arguments based upon alleged due process violations 
and lack of personal jurisdiction, especially in inter-jurisdictional cases.”171  
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, without making a specific 
determination as to whether personal jurisdiction is the requisite standard 
for issuing a victim protection order against a nonresident defendant, 
defaulted to personal jurisdiction when it was faced with a similar 
situation.172  In Stacy v. Ferrel, Carolyn Stacy and her ex-boyfriend, Paul 
Ferrel, both lived in Texas.173  Ferrel harassed and stalked Stacey in Texas, 
and as a result she eventually moved to Ada, Oklahoma.174  Within a month 
                                                                                                                 
169.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, ' 1. 
170.  See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714, 732-3 (1878); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) 
(“It has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty in 
favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of 
the defendant.”). 
171.  FAMILY VIOLENCE DEP=T., NAT=L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAM. CT. JUDGES, A 
GUIDE FOR EFFECTIVE ISSUANCE & ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTION ORDERS 40 (2005) 
[hereinafter GUIDE]. 
172.  Stacy v. Ferrel, No. 101,253, & 11 (Okla. Civ. App. Jan. 6, 2006), http://oklegal. 
onenet.net/sample.basic.html (In the Database Menu select “OK Court of Appeals Opinions 
(1968-Current)”; search for “Stacy” in Field “Appellant”; search for “Ferrel” in Field 
“Appellee”; then Submit Query).  As of the publication date of this Comment, Stacy has not 
yet been released for publication in the permanent law reports, nor has Stacy been made 
available on a widely used electronic database.  The publication status of the case is publicly 
accessible through the Oklahoma Public Legal Research System.  See id. 
173.  Id. & 1. 
174.  Id. && 1-2. 
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after moving to Oklahoma, Stacy filed a petition for a victim protection 
order against Ferrel.175  In her petition she alleged that Ferrel attempted to 
follow her in Oklahoma.176  Ferrel made a special appearance challenging 
the state=s exercise of personal jurisdiction and offered evidence that he was 
not in the state of Oklahoma on the date Stacy claimed.177  The district 
court found that the state did have personal jurisdiction over Ferrel, 
presumably because the act that was the basis of Stacy=s cause of action 
allegedly occurred in the state.178   The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the 
district court=s decision.179 It found that Stacy did not meet her burden of 
establishing Ferrel=s minimum contacts with Oklahoma which would 
subject him to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court.180 
1. Victim Protection Orders are Civil Injunctions 
Amidst the confusion among the courts as to what jurisdictional 
requisites are required before issuing a victim protection order against a 
nonresident defendant, a simple question needs to be answered.  What is a 
victim protection order?  A victim protection order is a civil injunction.181 
In Curry v. Streater, the Oklahoma Supreme Court very clearly asserted 
that a victim protection order “is analogous to an injunction.”182  Three 
defining characteristics of injunctions are readily identifiable in victim 
protection orders.  First, an “[i]njunction is an equitable remedy.”183  
Likewise, a victim protection order is an equitable remedy; it does not 
provide a legal remedy for liability, such as money damages for the battery 
committed.  Second, an injunction is designed to protect one party=s rights 
“by prohibiting or commanding certain acts” of another party.184  An 
injunction demands that the defendant refrain from “a wrongful act or the 
causing of some threatened or anticipated injury.”185  That is precisely what 
a victim protection order does, but the wrongful act the defendant is 
prohibited from doing is commonly assaulting, threatening, contacting, or 
                                                                                                                 
175.  Id. & 1. 
176.  Id. 
177.  Id. & 2. 
178.  See id. && 4, 10. 
179.  Id. & 12.  
180.  Id. & 12. 
181.  See Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 8, 213. P3d 550, 554.  
182.  Id. 
183.  42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions ' 1 (2000); see also Barnes v. State, 1963 OK 152, & 
18, 383 P.2d 635, 639 (citing Fahr v. State, 1951 OK 286, & 7, 237 P.2d 128, 130) (“[A]n 
action for a permanent injunction . . . is an action of equitable cognizance.”). 
184.  42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions ' 1 (2000). 
185.  Id. ' 4. 
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harassing the plaintiff-victim.  These specific acts pose a very serious, 
imminent risk to the plaintiff=s safety and would likely result in injury.  
Third, injunctive relief is “preventative or protective in character and 
operates upon unperformed acts rather than upon those that have already 
occurred.”186 
Oklahoma courts have long held that an injunction “is to afford only 
preventative relief; it is powerless to correct wrongs or injuries already 
committed.”187  This is also true of the relief afforded through a victim 
protection order.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in 2009, asserted “[t]he 
[Protection from Domestic Abuse] Act=s clear purpose is preventative, and 
the Act provides immediate, civil, nonmonetary relief for victims of 
domestic abuse . . . [t]o effectuate its purpose, the Act provides for courts to 
issue civil protection orders to prevent violence before it happens.”188 
A victim protection order is a type of injunction because it is intended to 
protect the plaintiff from the recurrence of abuse or the materialization of 
threats into future violence.189  Furthermore, a victim protection order in 
itself is not a criminal judgment against the defendant, nor is it a civil, legal 
remedy intended to redress the wrongs committed by the defendant.190  
Often the terms victim protection order and injunction are used 
synonymously.191  For example, in the Violence Against Women Act, the 
United States Congress= definition of protection order included: 
[A]ny injunction, restraining order, or any other order issued by 
a civil . . . court for the purpose of preventing violent or 
threatening acts or harassment against, sexual violence, or 
contact or communication with or physical proximity to, another 
                                                                                                                 
186.  Id. ' 1. 
187.  Walcott v. Dennes, 1911 OK 285, & 3, 116 P. 784, 786 (quoting City of Alma v. 
Loehr, 22 P. 616 (Kan. 1889)). 
188.  Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 10, 213 P.3d 550, 555. 
189. See e.g., Waul, supra note 8, at 53 (“[S]tates began passing legislation allowing 
judges to grant injunctive orders to immediately stop abusive behavior between two 
parties.”) (emphasis added). 
190.  See Marquette v. Marquette, 1984 OK CIV APP 25, & 10, 686 P.2d 990, 993; see 
also Walcott, & 3, 116 P. at 786 (“[T]he exclusive function of a writ of injunction is to afford 
only preventative relief; it is powerless to correct wrongs or injuries already committed.”). 
191.  See, e.g., Jones, supra note 13, at 353 (footnotes omitted) (“The [Protection from 
Domestic Abuse] Act provides that a protective order may be enforced by the civil court that 
issued the injunction or by the criminal courts.”); GUIDE, supra note 171, at 51 (“Attorneys 
should work with other community members to make injunctive relief effective for 
clients.”); Tobkin v. State, 777 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he 
legislature has made a petition for injunction against domestic violence a private [cause of] 
action. . . . “). 
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person, including any temporary or final order issued by a civil 
or criminal court . . . obtained by filing an independent action . . . 
.192 
Whether deemed analogous or synonymous, victim protection orders 
serve the purpose of civil injunctions C they order the defendant to refrain 
from a specific act or acts that would likely result in injury to the plaintiff.  
In Marquette, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals found, “[the Protection 
from Domestic Abuse] Act . . . creates an additional framework through 
which the court may exercise its long recognized equitable power to grant 
restraining and injunctive orders in extraordinary circumstances.”193 
2. Because Victim Protection Orders Are Civil Injunctions, Personal 
Jurisdiction Is Required to Satisfy Due Process 
The next foundational question that must be answered is whether courts 
are required to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant before granting a 
civil injunction.  The settled rule is that an injunction operates in 
personam.194  If a victim protection order is actually a relatively recent, 
statutorily-guided civil injunction, then victim protection orders ought to be 
treated like injunctions.  Where Oklahoma=s Protection from Domestic 
Abuse Act is silent, the law governing traditional civil injunctions ought to 
govern victim protection orders. 
Thus far, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has fallen in line with this 
proposition.  When faced with the decision of how the court should 
evaluate the issuance of victim protection orders on appeal, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court has relied on the law of civil injunctions.195  In Curry, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court was presented with an issue of first impression 
and it addressed the standard of review for victim protection orders issued 
under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act.196  The court held that 
“proceedings under the Act . . . should be reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion” because “[a] protection order under the Protection from 
Domestic Abuse Act . . . is analogous to an injunction.”197  The court relied 
on the abuse of discretion standard of review for granting or denying an 
                                                                                                                 
192.  18 U.S.C. ' 2266(5)(A) (2006). 
193.  Marquette, & 11, 686 P.2d at 994 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
194. Barnes v. State, 1963 OK 152, & 19, 383 P.2d 635, 639 (citing Howard v. 
Berryman, 1930 OK 267, & 10, 288 P. 605, 607 (“The remedy of injunction is strictly in 
personam.  The decree operates and is enforceable against the individual . . . .”)). 
195.  See Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 8, 213 P.3d 550, 554. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. 
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injunction, and held that the proper standard of review for issuing a victim 
protection order is, likewise, abuse of discretion.198 
If a victim protection order is an injunction, and appellate courts apply 
the same standard of review for both injunctions and victim protection 
orders because they are essentially the same legal tool, then it follows that 
the same jurisdictional limitations that apply when Oklahoma courts enjoin 
the acts of a nonresident defendant ought to apply when issuing victim 
protections orders against a nonresident defendant.  An injunction issued by 
an Oklahoma district court must comport with due process, and is valid 
only if the issuing court has personal jurisdiction over the parties.199  
Therefore, if a victim protection order issued by an Oklahoma district court 
is an injunction, it is only valid if the court has personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant-abuser.  Without personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, a victim protection order issued by the state of Oklahoma 
violates the defendant=s right to procedural due process guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.200 
Arguments that victim protections orders should not be governed by the 
law of injunctions culminate around the unique characteristics and 
provisions that distinguish the Protection from Domestic Violence Act from 
the civil injunction statutes.  First, the Oklahoma legislature designated a 
specific section of the Oklahoma Statutes to provide for victim protection 
orders.201  Victim protection orders do not come under the general civil 
injunction statute.202  Instead, the Oklahoma legislature elected to create a 
“special statute[] that provide[s] alternate procedures for the obtaining of 
temporary restraining orders or temporary injunctions.”203  Additionally, the 
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act was not incorporated into the state=s 
criminal code; the criminal prosecution of the defendant-abuser is not a 
                                                                                                                 
198.  Id. (citing Johnson v. Ward, 1975 OK 129, & 42, 541 P.2d 182, 188). 
199.  Howard, & 10, 288 P. at 607 (“An injunction operates in personam and it will not 
issue against one not within the jurisdiction of the Court.”) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions ' 1 (2000) (“An injunction will not issue against one 
who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.”).  An injunction provides equitable relief 
and a court must have both subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the parties to 
exercise its power.  See 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity ' 62 (2008). 
200.  See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). 
201.  Compare 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007), with 12 OKLA. STAT. 
'' 1381-1397 (2001). “This section shall not apply . . . to proceedings brought pursuant to 
special statutes that provide alternate procedures for the obtaining of temporary restraining 
orders or temporary injunctions.” 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 1384.1.E (2001). 
202.  See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 1384.1 (2001). 
203.  Id. ' 1384.1.E. 
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prerequisite for obtaining a victim protection order under the Act.204  The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that  
an injunction will not issue to restrain commission of a 
threatened act merely to prevent the violation of a penal statute . 
. . unless a statute provides a remedy by injunction to restrain 
violations . . . [W]here an injunction is otherwise warranted, the 
court may enjoin certain acts affecting rights, property and 
general welfare of people even though such acts are also criminal 
offenses.205   
Second, unlike most civil actions, the plaintiff-victim does not have to 
pay court fees and costs, including “the filing fee, service of process fee, 
[or] attorneys fees.”206  This is indicative of the legislature=s objective of 
providing victims greater access to victim protection orders.  As a matter of 
fact, the only time the plaintiff filing for a victim protection order would 
have to pay attorneys fees and courts costs is if the court makes a special 
finding that the petition for a protection order was filed frivolously.207 
Third, when a civil injunction is violated, the courts may hold the 
defendant in civil contempt.208  When found in contempt, the violator may 
be kept in custody until he complies with the injunction, or be fined up to 
two-hundred dollars per day of noncompliance and serve up to six months 
in jail.209  When a victim protection order is violated, the defendant faces 
criminal sanctions which may result in a five-thousand dollar fine and up to 
one year in the county jail.210  The criminal sanctions imposed for violating 
a victim protection order demonstrate the serious nature of domestic abuse 
and the state=s interest in preventing abuse.  However poignant these 
arguments may be, they do not justify classifying victim protection orders 
as something other than civil injunctions with specific statutorily-defined 
characteristics and the legislatively-sanctioned possibility of criminal 
contempt for violation.  
Requiring personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant before the 
court issues a victim protection order not only safeguards the defendant=s 
right to due process, but it also ensures maximum protection for the victim.  
                                                                                                                 
204.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
205.  Anderson v. Trimble, 1974 OK 2, & 23, 519 P.2d 1352, 1356. 
206.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2.C.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
207.  Id. ' 60.2.C.2. 
208.  12 OKLA. STAT. ' 1390 (2001). 
209.  Id. 
210.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.6.B.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
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The federal government acknowledged the interstate nature of domestic 
violence and provided additional protection for victims in the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA).211  The VAWA sets out that: “Any 
protection order issued . . . by the court of one State . . . shall be accorded 
full faith and credit by the court of another State . . . and enforced by the 
court and law enforcement personnel of the other State” so long as the 
issuing “court has jurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law of 
such State.”212  The VAWA requires that a victim protection order be given 
full faith and credit if the order is valid.213  An order is only valid if the 
court issuing the order has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 214   If 
the issuing court does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
constitutional due process requirements have not been met.215  Oklahoma 
adopted the VAWA=s position in the Uniform Interstate Enforcement of 
Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act.216  The VAWA also makes it a 
crime for an abuser to travel across state lines for the purpose of violating a 
victim protection order.217  This provision of VAWA is particularly 
important to self-enforcement of a victim protection order.  In the scenarios 
examined in this comment the abuser and victim live in different states. 
As a result, if an Oklahoma court has personal jurisdiction over the out-
of-state defendant and issues a valid victim protection order against him, 
and the abuser wishes to violate the order and pursue his victim in 
Oklahoma, he is not only subject to the criminal sanctions imposed by the 
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, but also a federal, criminal 
penalty.218  Again, to gain the protections of the VAWA, the court must 
issue a valid order that complies with due process.  Without personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, the order does not have to be given full faith 
and credit by other states, nor is the defendant subject to federal criminal 
law for violating the order. 
                                                                                                                 
211.  18 U.S.C. '' 2261-2266 (2006). 
212.  Id. ' 2265(a)-(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
213.  See id. 
214. Susan B. Carbon et al., Enforcing Domestic Violence Protection Orders Throughout 
the Country: New Frontiers of Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence, 50 JUV. & FAM. 
CT. J. 39, 40 (1999); JANET R. FINK, Full Faith and Credit Mandate, in THE IMPACT OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE 9-7, 9-11 (Deborah M. Goelman et al. eds., 
1996). 
215. Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of Protection 
Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q. 253, 256 (1995). 
216.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.21-60.29 (2008). 
217.  18 U.S.C. ' 2262 (2006). 
218.  See id.; 22 OKLA. STAT. ''60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
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3. Oklahoma May Have Personal Jurisdiction over Some Nonresident 
Defendants That Commit Acts of Domestic Abuse Outside the State 
The final question one must ask is whether nonresident defendants, such 
as John in the opening hypothetical, come within Oklahoma=s jurisdiction.  
A nonresident defendant is not subject to adjudication in Oklahoma courts 
unless Oklahoma has personal jurisdiction over him.219  Oklahoma has 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if: (1) the defendant 
consents to the jurisdiction of the courts by making a general appearance 
and failing to raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction;220 (2) the defendant is 
served with process in the state of Oklahoma;221 or (3) the defendant has 
certain “minimum contacts with [the state of Oklahoma] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”222  Without personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant, due process is violated.223 
In Kulko, the United States Supreme Court applied the minimum 
contacts principle set forth in International Shoe v. Washington to domestic 
relations.224  The Court ruled that mere acquiescence of a divorced father, 
who was a resident of New York, to his daughter=s desire to live with her 
mother in California did not confer jurisdiction to the California court in a 
custody dispute.225  The Court explained that “[t]he unilateral activity of 
those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant” does not 
by itself satisfy the minimum contacts requirement.226  Instead, the court 
held that there must be some purposeful act by the nonresident such that the 
nonresident makes use “of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State.”227  Thus, the quality and nature of the nonresident defendant=s 
activities must be such that it is reasonable and fair to require him to defend 
the lawsuit in Oklahoma “notwithstanding that the forum state and the 
plaintiff have an interest in proceeding in the forum state.”228 
                                                                                                                 
219.  See Int=l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
220. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2012.F.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007); First Tex. Sav. Ass=n v. 
Bernsen, 1996 OK CIV APP 24, & 6, 921 P.2d 1293, 1296. 
221.  See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990). 
222.  Gilbert v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of Okla., 2006 OK 58, & 16, 152 P.3d 165, 173 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
223.  See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). 
224.  Id. at 88, 92. 
225.  Id. at 94. 
226.  Id. at 93-4 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
227.  Id. at 94. 
228. Gullo v. Gullo, 2003 OK CIV APP 61, & 12, 74 P.3d 612, 616 (citing Kulko, 436 
U.S. at 92). 
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An Oklahoma court applied the reasoning in Kulko when a father 
appealed the trial court=s finding of personal jurisdiction and ordered child 
support and the division of he and his former spouse=s property.229  The 
disputed facts of Gullo v. Gullo provided that a wife and husband lived in 
Ohio, where she was abused.230  She moved to Oklahoma and filed for 
dissolution of marriage and sought child support.231  The court determined 
that in this situation, the traditional criteria for obtaining personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant applied.232  The husband did not 
have minimum contacts with Oklahoma, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals rejected the wife=s argument that public policy for providing 
support for Oklahoma children sustained personal jurisdiction.233  Based on 
the court=s decision in Gullo, Oklahoma courts are not likely to assert 
personal jurisdiction merely because of Oklahoma=s interest in protecting 
victims of domestic violence that live in the state.234  
Oklahoma adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) 
in the mid-1990s.235 Section 601-201 of Oklahoma=s version of UIFSA 
provides: 
A. In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to 
determine parentage, a tribunal of this state may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual . . . if: 1. The 
individual is personally served with summons within this state; 
2. The individuals submits to the jurisdiction of this state by 
consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a 
responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to 
personal jurisdiction; 3. The individual resided with the child in 
this state; 4. The individual resided in this state and provided 
prenatal expenses or support for the child. 5. The child resides in 
this state as a result of the acts or directives of the individual; . . 
. 8. There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of 
                                                                                                                 
229.  Id. & 5, 74 P.3d at 614. 
230.  Id. && 2, 6, 74 P.3d at 614. 
231. Id. && 2, 3, 74 P.3d at 614.  A wife claimed Oklahoma had jurisdiction under 
UIFSA because her child was in Oklahoma as a result of acts or directives of the nonresident 
parent to be charged with the support obligation, see 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201.A.5 (2001 & 
Supp. 2007), but the court rejected this argument because of the trial court=s failure to make 
a finding of fact.  See Gullo, && 7, 9, 749 P.3d at 614. 
232.  See id. & 23, 74 P.3d at 617 (citing Taylor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 431 (10th Cir. 
1990)). See also 43 OKLA. STAT. '' 601-201.A.5-.8 (2001 & Supp. 2007).  
233.  Gullo & 30, 74 P.3d at 618. 
234.  See id. & 15, 74 P.3d at 616. 
235.  43 OKLA. STAT. '' 601-100 to 601-901 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
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this state and the United States for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.236 
In Powers v. District Court of Tulsa County,237 the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma held that 43 Okla. Stat. ' 601-201.A.5., as a method of acquiring 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, complied with due 
process.238 
In Powers, the husband and wife resided in Missouri, where the husband 
allegedly abused the wife.239  The wife moved to Oklahoma and within a 
few days filed for legal separation, alimony, and child support, among other 
matrimonial-based claims.240  The nonresident husband filed a motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in the District Court.241  The 
husband=s motion to dismiss was granted, because the court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.242  Upon reconsideration, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court focused on the wife=s argument that her 
husband=s activities in Missouri “forced or directed her to move to 
Oklahoma.”243  The wife distinguished her situation from the wife in Kulko 
and asserted that “her presence in Oklahoma did not result from her 
unilateral conduct and [her h]usband=s mere acquiescence, but from 
purposeful conduct [of her h]usband.”244  The court determined that in 
Kulko, the plaintiff-mother=s conduct was unilateral because the nonresident 
defendant-father merely consented to his daughter living in California with 
her mother and sent her there.245  Likewise, Oklahoma has observed that “a 
parent=s mere acquiescence, or agreement, in one state for a child=s 
residence in a second state does not satisfy the ‘effects test;’ i.e., the 
acquiescence does not thereby cause an ‘effect’ in the second state 
justifying in personam jurisdiction.”246  The “effects” test recognizes that 
                                                                                                                 
236.  See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201.A (2001 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). 
237.  Powers v. Dist. Ct. of Tulsa Co., 2009 OK 91, 227 P.3d 1060.  
238.  See id. & 35, 227 P.3d at 1081.  
239.  Id. & 15, 227 P.3d at 1072.  
240.  Id. & 2, 227 P.3d at 1065.  
241.  Id. & 14, 227 P.3d at 1071.  
242.  See id. 
243.  Id. & 23, 227 P.3d at 1075.  
244.  Id. & 23, 227 P.3d at 1075-76.  
245.  Id. & 25, 227 P.3d at 1076-77 (citing Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 94 
(1978)). 
246.  See id. & 25, 227 P.3d at 1077 (citing Gullo v. Gullo, 2003 OK CIV APP 61, && 
14-16, 74 P.3d 612, 626). 
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an individual may cause an effect in one state as a consequence of acts 
performed outside the state.247 
In Kulko, the United States Supreme Court noted that the state of 
California had “not attempted to assert any particularized interest in trying 
such cases in its courts, by e.g. enacting a special jurisdictional statute.” 248  
But, unlike California law at the time Kulko was decided, Oklahoma had 
adopted Title 43, Section 601-201, which is a special jurisdictional 
statute.249  In Powers, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the husband=s 
argument and upheld the United States Supreme Court=s due process 
jurisprudence that the defendant=s “physical presence in Missouri and not 
Oklahoma is insufficient, by itself, to negate in personam jurisdiction based 
upon a minimum contacts test.”250  The court echoed the United States 
Supreme Court in Kulko, “The minimum contacts’ test . . . is not 
susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be 
weighed to determine whether the requisite affiliating circumstances are 
present.”251 
In Powers, the court directed its attention to In re Marriage of 
Malwitz,252 decided by the Colorado Supreme Court.253  In Malwitz, the 
court examined Colorado=s UIFSA statute and the language identical to that 
contained in ' 601-201 of Oklahoma=s UIFSA statute, which provides a 
basis for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if “[t]he child 
resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of the 
[defendant].”254  The Colorado Supreme Court found that based on the 
defendant=s acts of domestic violence against the plaintiff in Texas, “the 
Defendant=s actions were sufficient to constitute >acts or directives= that 
caused [the plaintiff] to flee Texas for Colorado within the meaning of 
[UIFSA].”255  The court found that the affirmative acts of the defendant C 
persistent abuse and harassment C effectively forced his pregnant wife and 
her daughter to flee Texas for Colorado.256  Furthermore, “[a]lthough the 
                                                                                                                 
247.  See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 96 (Court viewed this test as “reach[ing] wrongful activity 
outside the State causing injury within the State.”); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICTS OF LAWS ' 37 (1971). 
248.  Gullo, & 19, 74 P.3d at 616-17 (quoting Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98). 
249.  43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
250.  See Powers, 2009 OK 91, & 24, 227 P.3d at 1075.  
251.  Id. & 22 (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92) (internal quotations omitted). 
252.  In re Marriage of Malwitz, 99 P.3d 56 (Colo. 2004). 
253.  See Powers, 2009 OK 91, & 26, 227 P.3d at 1078 (citing Malwitz, 99 P.3d at 58-
59). 
254.  See id. (quoting 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201.A.5). 
255.  Malwitz, 99 P.3d at 59. 
256.  See id. at 61. 
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defendant did not specifically direct [the plaintiff] to leave . . . [she was 
left] with little choice but to leave Texas and seek safety near her father=s 
home in Colorado.”257  There were affiliating circumstances that brought 
the defendant in Malwitz within Colorado=s jurisdiction.  First, the wife=s 
only family resided in Colorado and the court determined the abusive 
husband knew or should have known that because of his actions his wife 
would flee to the protection of her family.258  Second, “very little time 
passed between the harassment” and abuse and the wife=s fleeing from 
Texas to Colorado for shelter.259 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the Colorado Supreme Court 
and held: 
Although acts of child and spouse abuse in one state are 
insufficient, by themselves, to create in personam jurisdiction 
over a non-resident spouse in a different state, we do agree with 
the Supreme Court of Colorado that affiliating circumstances 
such as those in Malwitz may provide the facts necessary to 
show that an abusive spouse is purposefully availing himself or 
herself of conducting activity in the forum state by directing and 
controlling where the abused spouse and child reside.260 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court indicated what affiliating circumstances 
district courts should consider when deciding whether a plaintiff=s location 
in Oklahoma is a result of the acts and directives of the defendant, thus 
conferring personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.261  In 
Powers, these affiliating circumstances included: (1) the husband=s 
agreement and desire that his family go to Oklahoma; (2) the wife=s 
relocation to Oklahoma as a result of the husband=s physical abuse; (3) the 
wife=s relocation to Oklahoma was the result of the husband=s complete and 
abrupt failure of both spousal and child economic support; and (4) the 
husband=s awareness that his lack of support required the wife and child to 
relocate to Oklahoma.262  The court found that because the “[h]usband 
allegedly created the circumstances of his wife and child living in 
Oklahoma without his economic support . . . Kulko cannot . . . be read as 
                                                                                                                 
257.  Id. 
258.  See id. at 59, 61. 
259.  Id. at 61. 
260.  Powers v. Dist. Ct. of Tulsa Cnty., 2009 OK 91, & 32, 227 P.3d 1060, 1080.   
261.  See id. & 34, 227 P.3d at 1080.  
262.  Id. & 30, 227 P.3d at 1078-79.  
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requiring a . . . wife and child to always seek legal relief only in the non-
resident=s state of residence.”263 
Section 601-201 cannot be read broader than what due process 
permits.264  In Gullo, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that section 601-
201 must be interpreted in harmony with due process and the United States 
Supreme Court=s decision in Kulko.265  The Oklahoma Supreme Court held 
that allegations of spousal abuse committed by the nonresident spouse in 
another jurisdiction and the affiliating circumstances C including the 
nonresident spouse=s purposeful conduct that caused the abused spouse to 
relocate in Oklahoma C may be used pursuant to Title 43, Section 601-
201.A.5 of the Oklahoma Statutes to obtain personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident spouse and is consistent with due process of law.266  The court 
noted that in Malwitz, the Colorado Supreme Court observed that “all states 
share a common interest in protecting victims of domestic abuse and 
providing an effective means for redress for such victims.”267  But the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court left the state=s interest there and stated that “[a]n 
interest to protect children and spouses that is shared in common with other 
forums, whether from abuse or lack of economic support, is insufficient, by 
itself, to make Oklahoma a fair forum as to a nonresident.”268  While this 
may seem counter-intuitive to Oklahoma=s desire to protect those residing 
within its borders, the constitutional guarantee of due process afforded 
defendants in civil disputes C including abusers C cannot be sacrificed in 
the name of public policy.  
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court is correct in finding that Section 601-
201 of Title 43 is a constitutional basis for exercising personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident in family support cases, it is logical to extend this 
reasoning when seeking a victim protection order against a nonresident 
defendant.  UIFSA as it exists today does not address victim protection 
                                                                                                                 
263.  Id. & 31, 227 P.3d at 1079-80.  
264.  Id. & 28, 227 P.3d at 1078.   
265.  Id. & 28, 227 P.3d at 1078 n. 52; see also Gullo v. Gullo, 2003 OK CIV APP 61, 
&& 18, 26, 74 P.3d 612, 616, 618. 
266. Powers, 2009 OK 91, & 36, 227 P.3d at 1081; but see id. & 4, 227 P.3d at 1082 
(Opala, J., concurring) (“I must counsel against taking an activist posture on any 
unsettled point of federal constitutional law.  Instead of pressing today for desired 
changed in the current state of the law I would much rather await further developments in 
the U.S. Supreme Court=s jurisprudence.”). 
267.  Id. & 31, 227 P.3d at 1079 (quoting In re Marriage of Malwitz, 99 P.3d 56, 63 
(Colo. 2004)). 
268.  Id. & 31. 
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orders, and it would be erroneous to include the issuance of victim 
protection orders in this section of the Oklahoma Statutes. 
The plain language of Oklahoma=s Protection from Domestic Abuse Act 
does not address jurisdiction.269  Victim protection statutes of other states, 
such as Pennsylvania, overtly demand personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.270  The best solution for Oklahoma is to add a provision to the 
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act that specifies jurisdiction regarding 
victim protection orders.  This provision could include language quite 
similar to that in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA).271  
The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act ought to read as follows: “In a 
proceeding to issue a victim protection order, a tribunal of this state may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual if the victim 
resides in Oklahoma as a result of the acts or directives of the individual.”  
The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act would then embody the state=s 
particular interest in adjudicating these disputes and contain special 
jurisdictional language, thus comporting with constitutional due process.272  
Following Powers, Oklahoma could exercise jurisdiction if the nonresident 
defendant abused the plaintiff and affiliating circumstances existed to show 
the defendant-abuser purposefully availed himself of this forum by 
controlling where the victim resided by effectively forcing her to seek 
shelter in Oklahoma.273 
Even if the method of ascertaining personal jurisdiction under UIFSA 
and Powers is not employed as a means of exercising personal jurisdiction 
over nonresident abusers in petitions for victim protection orders and the 
state cannot bring the abuser within its judicial jurisdiction, the victim 
residing in Oklahoma is not without a remedy.  The primary criticism of 
requiring personal jurisdiction over the defendant is that while it ensures 
procedural due process to the defendant, it undermines the state=s interest in 
the prevention of domestic violence.  The abuser may continue to pose a 
threat to his victim after she flees to Oklahoma.274  The victim must be 
                                                                                                                 
269.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
270.  See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. ' 6103(b) (West Supp. 2010) (“The right of the 
plaintiff to relief under this chapter shall not be affected by . . . [t]he defendant=s absence 
from this Commonwealth or the defendant=s nonresidence in this Commonwealth, provided 
that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
271.  See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201 (2001 & 
Supp. 2009).  
272.  See Gullo v. Gullo, 2003 OK CIV APP 61, & 19, 74 P.3d 612, 616-17 (quoting 
Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978)). 
273.  See Powers v. Dist. Ct. of Tulsa Cnty., 2009 OK 91, & 32, 227 P.3d 1060, 1080.   
274.  See GUIDE, supra note 171, at 60 (advising judges to “[u]se the state=s long-arm 
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faced with the reality of abuse again before she is afforded the state=s 
protection, because the abuser must establish minimum contacts with this 
state. 
The first likely scenario and possible way that the abuser could establish 
minimum contacts with the state (without committing acts of physical 
violence within the state) is that the abuser pursues the victim into 
Oklahoma, where she is seeking shelter.275  Second, placing phone calls 
into the state may be enough to sustain personal jurisdiction because the 
abuser knows when he makes the calls that they are being purposefully 
directed at the victim in the state.276 
Alternatively, the victim could always return to the place of abuse or 
where the defendant resides and apply for a victim protection order under 
that state=s law.  For example, Sarah from the opening hypothetical would 
need to return to Kansas.  The jurisdictional issue does not arise if the 
petition for protection is filed in the defendant=s state of residence.  
Furthermore, when Sarah comes back to Oklahoma, the valid Kansas order 
will be given “full faith and credit” by the state of Oklahoma.277  While this 
option is not the most desirable, it is effective, because the issuing court has 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Unfortunately, all of these scenarios require a greater risk of danger to 
the victim than simply issuing the victim protection order as a status 
determination, or without affirmative relief.  This is incongruent with 
Oklahoma=s policy behind the passage of the Protection from Domestic 
Abuse Act.  Another criticism of requiring personal jurisdiction is that it 
undermines the Oklahoma legislature=s emphasis on access in the Protection 
from Domestic Abuse Act.278  Read to exclude applicability to nonresident 
                                                                                                                 
statute to obtain jurisdiction over out-of-state respondents who pose a continuing threat to 
victims who have fled across state lines”). 
275.  See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 796 A.2d 879 (N.J. 2002).  A husband abused his wife in 
New York.  Id. at 880. The wife went to her sister=s house in New Jersey for safety.  Id.  The 
husband came to the house in New Jersey.  Id.  Because the husband pursued his victim from 
New York and committed an act of violence against her in New Jersey (pounding on her 
sister=s house), the court found there was personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 888.  
276.  See McNair v. McNair, 856 A.2d 5, 13-15 (N.H. 2004) (phone calls were the acts 
upon which the cause of action was based and alleged in petition for victim protection 
order); Beckers v. Seck, 14 S.W.3d 139, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); A.R. v. M.R., 799 A.2d 
27, 31-32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that the abuser=s mere promise to pursue 
the victim before she left the state where he resides would not have been enough to sustain 
personal jurisdiction). But see Anderson v. Deas, 615 S.E.2d 859, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) 
(requiring abuser=s physical entry into Georgia to establish minimum contacts). 
277.  22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.12.A (2001). 
278.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2 (providing for standard filing forms and waiving filing 
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defendant-abusers, the Act only provides protection to a limited group of 
women C those whose abusers are located in the state and those who were 
abused in the state.  Victims who escape the home they share with their 
abusers and come to Oklahoma looking for support and safety in the homes 
of their friends and family will not find further protection in emergency ex 
parte victim protection orders. 
B. A Victim Protection Order Is Not a Status Determination Because It 
Does Not Alter the Relationship Status of the Victim and the Abuser 
The adjudication of a plaintiff=s status in relation to a defendant does not 
require personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, because the 
court is not asserting a personal judgment against the defendant and the 
status of those within the state=s borders is of great interest to the state.279   
While states certainly have a strong interest in protecting victims, a victim 
protection order is not an adjudication of the victim=s status because it does 
not alter the relationship between the parties.280  The Supreme Court of 
Iowa in Bartsch incorrectly held that a victim protection order “does not 
purport to grant affirmative relief against the defendant; it merely preserves 
the protected status accorded to the plaintiff.”281  A significant flaw in the 
court=s reasoning was its failure to support its proposition that “protected 
victim” is a recognized declaration on the status relationship between the 
plaintiff-victim and the defendant-abuser, and Oklahoma courts should not 
embrace this approach. 
The Bartsch court relied on In re Adoption of J.L.H., an Oklahoma 
Supreme Court case, in extending status jurisdiction to include the issuance 
of victim protection orders.282  J.L.H. was an adoption case; adoption 
clearly affects the status relationship of the parties to the lawsuit.283  In 
J.L.H., the biological mother-defendant was a nonresident of Oklahoma.284  
The biological father and stepmother petitioned for the nonconsensual 
adoption of her children.285  The Oklahoma Court acknowledged that the 
                                                                                                                 
fees); id. ' 60.3 (allowing for temporary victim protection orders to be granted ex parte). 
279.  See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714, 734 (1877) (“The jurisdiction which every State possesses, to determine the civil status 
and capacities of all its inhabitants. . . .”). 
280.  But see Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 10 (Iowa 2001) (holding that a victim 
protection order is an adjudication of the victim=s status). 
281.  Id. at 6. 
282.  See id. at 8 (citing In re Adoption of J.L.H., 1987 OK 25, 737 P.2d 915). 
283.  See In re Adoption of J.L.H., 1987 OK 25, & 1, 737 P.2d 915, 917. 
284.  See id., & 2, 737 P.2d at 917. 
285.  See id., & 3, 737 P.2d at 917. 
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“minimum contacts doctrine . . . was fashioned to gauge the standards of 
due process for the exercise of jurisdiction to render an in personam 
judgment against one not served within the state.”286  In J.L.H., however, no 
in personam judgment was sought against the nonresident mother; rather, 
the plaintiffs were asking the court to rule on the status relationship 
between the nonresident defendant and her children.287  The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court referred to the Restatement of Judgments and the 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws before extending status jurisdiction to non-
consensual adoption.288  According to Section 7 of the Restatement of 
Judgments, “[a] state may exercise jurisdiction to establish or terminate a 
status if the status has a sufficient relationship to the state.”289  Those 
relationships include divorce, legal separation, marriage annulment, 
adoption, and child custody.290  In J.L.H., the court found “Oklahoma=s 
cognizance is invoked to settle the status of [the nonresident defendant=s] 
minor children.”291  What was adjudicated was a “quest to change the 
underage children=s parental status vis-a-vis [sic] their nonresident and 
noncustodial mother.”292 
The Supreme Court of Iowa took the strong state interest in protecting 
victims and, without sound reasoning, twisted it into a status 
determination.293  A victim protection order does not parallel an 
adjudication affecting the family  relationship; therefore, it is not a status 
determination.  In fact, the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act 
specifically creates a cause of action for victims that are not in a legal 
relationship with their abusers.294  There is unquestionably a strong state 
interest in protecting victims of abuse, but that does not justify reclassifying 
a cause of action for equitable relief as a declaration of one=s status.295  If an 
                                                                                                                 
286.  Id., & 9, 737 P.2d at 919. 
287.  See id. 
288.  See id. n.13. 
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ' 7 (1982) (“Relationships sufficient to 
support exercises of such jurisdiction in matters of family status are stated in Restatement, 
Second, Conflict of Laws '' 70-79.”). 
290.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS '' 70-79 (1971).   
291.   J.L.H., & 9, 737 P.2d at 919 n.13. 
292.  Id. & 9, 737 P.2d at 918. 
293.  See Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Iowa 2001). 
294.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60.1.1, 60.1.4-60.1.5 (2001 & Supp. 2007). Victims can file 
a petition for a victim protection order if they have lived or live in the same household with 
their abuser, regardless of their marital status, or if they have been in a dating relationship 
with their abuser. See id. 
295.  See Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 11 (Carter, J., dissenting) (“What Tara Bartsch sought 
from an Iowa court was not a declaration of her status, but rather a grant of injunctive relief 
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order of protection is not a status determination and the court issuing the 
order does not have personal jurisdiction, due process has been violated. 
The concurring opinion in Doe v. Iowa District Court for Scott County 
echoed the arguments of the Bartsch dissent.296  The relief prescribed in a 
victim protection order goes “beyond a status determination and 
constitute[s] a grant of injunctive relief against the defendant, and . . . 
therefore require[s] that the defendant have minimum contacts with the 
State of Iowa sufficient to avoid offending historical and well-developed 
concepts of due process of law.”297  It is also noteworthy that while Iowa 
was the first state to rule on this issue, there is disagreement among its own 
high court, and the majority=s reasoning has rarely been followed by 
jurisdictions outside of Iowa.298  
A victim protection order, which demands or forbids specific behavior 
between the parties, alters the relationship between plaintiff and defendant 
to the same degree as when the court enjoins one farmer from tilling the 
land of a neighboring farmer.  The once-amicable relationship between the 
two farmers is likely to sour.  Certainly, no one would argue this court order 
alters the status relationship between the farmers.  There is a stark 
difference between commanding the defendant to do a specific act or to 
refrain from certain acts and establishing, modifying, or terminating a status 
relationship between a citizen of the state and a nonresident.  A victim 
protection order is the former type of action. 
C. Allowing a Distinction Between Prohibitive And Affirmative Relief to 
Have an Effect on Jurisdictional Requirements Is Without Precedent 
The courts in Spencer, Caplan, Hemenway, and Shah found that so long 
as the victim protection order is limited to prohibitive orders and does not 
assert affirmative obligations on the nonresident defendant, personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is not needed to satisfy due 
process.299  While this approach is appealing because it purports to ensure 
                                                                                                                 
against a party beyond the jurisdiction of the Iowa court.  Nor did the district court attempt 
to adjudicate her status in any manner.”). 
296. No. 06-0696, 2007 WL 913851, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2007) (Miller, J., 
concurring). 
297.  Id. 
298.  But see Caplan v. Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117, 124 (Mass. 2008).  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court did not adopt Bartsch in its pure form. The court defined constitutional 
limitations for status determinations and held that if the victim protection order provides for 
so-called affirmative relief, personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is required.  
Id. 
299.  Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); Caplan v. Donovan, 879 
N.E.2d 117, 124-25 (Mass. 2008); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 582 (N.H. 
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due process and also supply effective relief to domestic violence victims, it 
is unfounded.  These courts draw a distinction between ordering an abuser 
to do a specific act, such as attending domestic violence counseling300 or 
compensating the plaintiff,301 and ordering him not to do a specific act, such 
as not contacting or abusing the plaintiff.302  These distinctions are 
problematic at best C and specious at worst C because these courts demand 
different due process requirements based upon the so-called type of relief.  
The bottom line is that, whether termed “affirmative” or “prohibitive” 
relief, a victim protection order is an equitable remedy, and equitable 
remedies require personal jurisdiction.303  
The distinctions between “affirmative” and “prohibitive” relief most 
likely derive from the distinctions some courts have made between 
prohibitory and mandatory injunctions.  The Tenth Circuit examined these 
types of injunctions in O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. 
Ashcroft.304  The court observed that there are three types of historically 
disfavored preliminary injunctions, one of which is “mandatory as opposed 
to prohibitory.”305  The limited purpose of a preliminary injunction is to 
preserve the status quo.306  The Tenth Circuit held that disfavored 
injunctions, such as mandatory injunctions, are subject to higher scrutiny 
because they alter the status quo.307  While this distinction may be pertinent 
to a court=s decision-making process for granting or denying an injunction, 
this test is irrelevant determining whether jurisdiction exists to grant that 
injunction in the first place. 
Oklahoma courts have also long recognized the differences between 
prohibitive and mandatory injunctions.308  A mandatory injunction is an 
extraordinary remedy that “commands the performance of some positive 
act.”309  The Shah, Spencer, Caplan, and Hemenway courts are mistaken to 
                                                                                                                 
2010); Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931, 937 (N.J. 2005). 
300.  See Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 19. 
301.  See Caplan, 879 N.W.2d at 125. 
302.  See id. 
303. See 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity ' 62 (2008) (“A court cannot exercise its equitable 
powers if it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the parties.”). 
304. 389 F.3d 973, 977, aff=d on other grounds, Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 
(2006). 
305.  Id. 
306.  See id. (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). 
307.  Id. at 979-80. 
308.  Dusbabek v. Local Bldg. & Loan Ass=n, 1936 OK 769, & 8, 63 P.2d 756, 759 
(“[A]n injunction may be either preventative (prohibitory) to restrain the commission or the 
continuance of an act; or mandatory, to require the doing or undoing of an act.”). 
309.  Dale v. City of Yukon, 1980 OK CIV APP 55, & 9, 618 P.2d 954, 957 (citing Peck 
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infer that personal jurisdiction is not required if the injunction is 
prohibitive.  An injunction, whether classified as prohibitive or affirmative, 
is still a judgment against the person; therefore, personal jurisdiction is 
required to satisfy due process.310 
By misunderstanding the prohibitory-mandatory distinction among 
injunctions and mistakenly believing this distinction has jurisdictional 
effect, the Shah and Spencer courts indirectly acknowledged that victim 
protection orders are injunctions.311  These courts did not misconstrue the 
law on status jurisdiction when they arrived at this prohibitive-affirmative 
distinction; instead, they misconstrued the jurisdictional requisites for a 
court to issue a valid injunction.  If victim protection orders are injunctions, 
as the Shah and Spencer courts appear to concede, then personal 
jurisdiction is required over a nonresident defendant. 
Even if these courts correctly found that personal jurisdiction is not 
needed for issuing a prohibitive protective order, the benefits of this legal 
construct would not be felt in Oklahoma because all victim protection 
orders in Oklahoma contain so-called affirmative relief as a matter of 
law.312  When the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided the proper standard of 
review for victim protection orders, it warned that “the unwarranted 
issuance of a protective order can have unjustified, irreversible 
consequences for a defendant.”313  The court emphasized the fact that, 
according to both state and federal law, if one has a victim protection order 
issued against him, he cannot possess a firearm.314  The federal Gun Control 
Act provides that anyone against whom a victim protection order has been 
issued is precluded from owning, possessing, or transporting a firearm.315  
                                                                                                                 
v. State, 1960 OK 89, & 7, 350 P.2d 948, 950). 
310. See Chickasaw Tel. Co. v. Drabek, 1996 OK 76, & 9, 921 P.2d 333, 337.  In 
Drabek, the court emphasized that “[e]quity follows the law” and due process requires 
personal jurisdiction over the parties in an action for an injunction.  Id. & 5, 921 P.2d at 335. 
The act to be enjoined was the defendant=s interference with the plaintiff=s installation of 
cable.  See id. && 2-3, 921 P.2d at 334-35.  The injunction sought would prohibit the 
defendant from interfering with the plaintiff, not compel the defendant to take action.  See id. 
& 4, 921 P.2d at 335. 
311.  Contra Caplan v. Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117, 123 (Mass. 2008).  The Caplan court 
agreed with Bartsch that the issuance of a victim protection order requires status jurisdiction 
but that due process limitations barred affirmative relief.  Id. 
312.  See Petition for Protective Order and Petition for Emergency Temporary Protective 
Order, supra note 23. 
313.  Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 11, 213 P.3d 550, 555. 
314.  See id. (citing 21 OKLA. STAT. ' 1290.11(A)(8) (2001 & Supp. 2007) and 18 U.S.C. 
' 922(g) (2006)). 
315.  18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(8). 
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The federal prohibitions on gun possession are “non-discretionary” and 
“not an option that the victim may request.  The federal prohibitions are 
absolute.”316  The state law of Oklahoma prohibits a person against whom a 
final protection order is entered from getting a concealed weapons license 
for three years after the date of the order.317  The state law prohibiting the 
possession of a firearm only applies to a final protective order and does not 
apply to an ex parte emergency order.318  The federal law, on the other 
hand, does not distinguish between emergency ex parte and final protective 
orders; both types of victim protection orders prohibit an abuser from 
possessing a firearm.319 
All three of the courts that adopted the middle-of-the road prohibitive-
affirmative approach in determining whether personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant is necessary recognized that the surrender of firearms 
C whether in accordance with state law or by order of the court C is 
affirmative relief, and personal jurisdiction is required to make such an 
order.320  The Gun Control Act makes the surrender of firearms a 
mandatory order because it criminalizes possession of firearms by the 
abuser after a victim protection order has been issued.321  Therefore, so-
called affirmative relief is always embodied in a victim protection order, 
and personal jurisdiction is always required. 
Two other problems arise from the reasoning of the prohibitive-
affirmative distinction.  Both are a drain on judicial resources.  First, judges 
hearing requests for victim protection orders have wide discretion in the 
relief they can order.322  This means that a trial judge would have to craft 
his or her orders according to whether personal jurisdiction was obtained, 
and rule on motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based not 
just upon the relief sought by the victim but upon what relief the judge 
                                                                                                                 
316.  Carbon, supra note 214, at 48. 
317.  21 OKLA. STAT. ' 1290.11(A)(8) (2001 & Supp. 2009). 
318.  See id.; see also 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 
 60.11 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (“[E]ach ex parte or final protective order issued pursuant to 
the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act shall have a statement printed in bold-faced type or 
in capital letters containing the following information: . . . Possession of a firearm or 
ammunition by a defendant while an order is in effect may subject the defendant to 
prosecution for a violation of federal law even if the order does not specifically prohibit the 
defendant from possession of a firearm or ammunition.”); see Petition for Protective Order 
and Petition for Emergency Temporary Protective Order, supra note 23. 
319.  See 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g) (2006). 
320. Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); Caplan v. Donovan, 
879 N.E.2d 117, 125 (Mass. 2008); Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931, 140 (N.J. 2005). 
321.  See 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(8) (2006). 
322.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.4(C)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2009).   
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might order that is “necessary to bring about the cessation of domestic 
abuse against the victim.”323  Some defendants may consent to the 
jurisdiction of the court by appearing.  But if a nonresident defendant has 
not waived the right to object for lack of personal jurisdiction, he will be 
able to challenge jurisdiction of any judgment that says more than “stay 
away.”  Existing victim protection orders would have to be examined 
retrospectively to determine if the nonresident defendant has a basis to 
challenge a court=s jurisdiction to issue initial and subsequent orders. 
Second, if a court does not have personal jurisdiction when it issues a 
judgment against an individual, that order is not valid, and full faith and 
credit is not mandated by law.  The Uniform Interstate Enforcement of 
Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act is not triggered unless the court 
has personal jurisdiction, ensuring the validity of the victim protection 
order.324  The court in Shah acknowledged this legal principle when it 
observed, “Should a court outside New Jersey having . . . personal 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff and defendant . . . issue an order adjudicating 
the domestic violence complaint, that order is afforded full faith and 
credit.”325  Judges would have to examine orders from other states for the 
presence of affirmative relief, and could only give full faith and credit to 
those issued against nonresident defendants over whom the foreign states 
had personal jurisdiction. 
V. Conclusion 
Unfortunately, the reality is that an abusive situation like Sarah and 
John=s is not terribly uncommon.  Oklahoma has been a state at the 
forefront of recognizing the tragedy of domestic violence, creating 
awareness among society, and offering victims help.  But Oklahoma, strong 
in its adherence to constitutional law, cannot sacrifice due process rights 
even in the name of something as appalling as domestic abuse C and 
Oklahoma need not do so.  Oklahoma has recognized that the outer bounds 
of due process allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants when their abuse effectively forces their victims into the state.  
Language should be added to the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act 
clarifying this point.  Oklahoma=s shared interest in preventing abuse, when 
coupled with acts of abuse committed by the defendant in another state and 
                                                                                                                 
323. Id.; see Petition for Protective Order and Petition for Emergency Temporary 
Protective Order, supra note 23. 
324.  See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60.23.A., 60.23.D.3 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
325.  Shah, 875 A.2d at 942 n.7. 
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the establishment of minimum contacts with Oklahoma by directing and 
controlling the wife=s relocation to the state, justifiably subjects a 
nonresident defendant-abuser to the jurisdiction of the state. 
 
 Bevan J. Graybill 
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